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Appraising the Socio-Economic Turn in
Reparations: Transitional Justice for Cholera
Victims in Haiti
Nicolas Lemay-Hébert* and Rosa Freedman**
A B S T R A C T1
After belatedly apologizing for the cholera epidemic in Haiti, the ‘New Approach to
Cholera in Haiti’ by the UN and the promise of material assistance to victims through
a ‘victim-centred approach’ highlight how the victims turn and the socio-economic
turn are increasingly pivotal in the field of transitional justice. In light of these growing
calls, we suggest a matrix to clarify the debate made of two separate dimensions: the
focus of reparations – collective versus individual – and the means of reparations –
symbolic versus material. Based on fieldwork conducted in March 2017 in the
communities most affected by the cholera outbreak, this article demonstrates how the
tensions between reparations offered by the UN (with a preference for collective
symbolic reparations) and the reparations demanded by the victims (individual mater-
ial reparations) can help understand the current stalemate in Haiti, and hopefully in-
form the next steps in the process of remedy for the victims.
K E Y W O R D S : Cash transfers, compensation, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, United
Nations
I N T R O D U C T I O N
There is a growing discussion in the literature on whether or not gross human rights
violations occurring during natural disasters should be addressed through transitional
justice processes, and in parallel, there is international legal momentum behind
claims for reparations and compensation.1 The case of cholera in Haiti was a catalyst
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in bringing these issues to the forefront. The actual role of the United Nations in the
Haitian tragedy, an actor whose mandate included bringing stability to the country,
makes this discussion all the more relevant. If other instances of natural disasters are
met with a relative sense of fatality by Haitians, the discussion took a different turn
in Haiti once the clear source of the epidemic had been established as the United
Nations Nepalese camp near Mirebalais. One could argue that all natural disasters in-
clude injustices and that massive violations of human rights should be properly dealt
with, but the case of the cholera epidemic became an emblematic case for Haitians in
terms of reparations and compensation.
This article makes the point that debates around transitional justice – understood as
‘efforts to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses’2 – can inform the process
of finding a right and just solution to this issue. Transitional justice is usually understood
to include four distinct pillars: truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.
In the context of this article, we will focus exclusively on the reparation pillar. This article
engages with the literature on compensation and reparation in transitional justice,3 by
connecting two specific turns in the literature: the victim-centred turn and the socio-
economic turn. To clarify the policy debates around reparations, we suggest a matrix
made of two separate dimensions: one analysing the means of reparations (symbolic ver-
sus material) and the other one looking at the focus of reparations (collective vs individ-
ual). We suggest that this model can help understand the variety of practices in specific
contexts, and help inform the current debate on how the international community
should compensate cholera victims in Haiti. One of the main findings of our research is
the unmitigated desire from local communities to access individual material reparations
instead of the standard collective reparation that is usually presented as the de facto solu-
tion for the compensation issue. The UN has outlined two potential approaches to ma-
terial assistance, namely community projects in areas most affected by cholera (the
community or collective approach) and payments to the families of those who died (the
individual approach). The UN has pledged to consult with victims in developing the ma-
terial assistance package, but in practice it ‘has foreclosed that possibility [monetary pay-
ments] seemingly without carrying out consultations or producing a detailed feasibility
assessment’ according to the 14 UN mandate holders.4 Hence, according to the same
mandate holders, ‘compensation is ordinarily a central component of the right to an
Mac Ginty, ‘Reparations and Peacebuilding: Issues and Controversies,’ Human Rights Review 14(3)
(2013): 231.
2 Pablo De Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice,’ in Transitional Justice, ed. Melissa Williams, Rosemary
Nagy and Jon Elster (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 40; see also: Marita Eastmond,
‘Introduction: Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Everyday Life in War-torn Societies,’ Focaal: Journal of
Global and Historical Anthropology 57 (2010): 3–16.
3 If reparation generally refers to material compensation in common parlance, the concept has been used in
the transitional justice literature in a wider sense as a process with the purpose of ‘relieving the suffering of
and affording justice to victims by removing or redressing to the extent possible the consequences of the
wrongful acts and by preventing and deterring violations.’ Roman David and Susanne Choi Yuk-ping,
‘Victims on Transitional Justice: Lessons From the Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in the Czech
Republic,’ Human Rights Quarterly 27(4) (2005): 393.
4 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘UN Inaction Denies
Justice for Haiti Cholera Victims, Say UN Experts,’ 30 April 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25851&LangID=E (accessed 5 August 2021)
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effective remedy, and development projects are simply not a replacement for repara-
tions.’5 As such, this article answers the call for more empirical research on victims’ percep-
tions of justice,6 and highlights the importance of material compensation in the process of
reconciliation, an element that has been highlighted by previous landmark studies.7
This article is divided into three sections. The first section locates the debate around
reparations in the transitional justice literature, highlighting the growing call for a victims
turn as well as a socio-economic turn in the field. This article makes a unique contribu-
tion to the literature by suggesting that a matrix can help us better understand repara-
tions debates, looking at the intersection between two variables: the focus of reparations
(collective or individual) and the means of reparations (material or symbolic). In doing
so, we contribute to the literature, linking international development with transitional
justice, and highlighting the fact that they have more commonalities than differences be-
tween them. The second section highlights how the field of international development
has increasingly shifted towards cash transfers, thus highlighting the importance of indi-
vidualized material reparations. The third section briefly summarizes the cholera issue in
Haiti and its significance, whilst the fourth section presents how we have used participa-
tory action research to conduct fieldwork in Haiti. The fifth section finally presents the
results of our fieldwork, and especially how participants have discussed the importance
of consultation, but also their positions on individual and collective reparations. It
appears clearly that the victims and representatives of victims show a preference for indi-
vidual material reparations, and the article discusses why they express this opinion.
T H E D I F F E R E N T D I M E N S I O N S O F R E P A R A T I O N S
This article sits at the intersection of two specific ‘turns’ in the transitional justice
literature. First, there is a general move towards victim-centred approaches in transi-
tional justice, understood as a victims turn in transitional justice8 and defined as a
primary emphasis on the rights, agency and perspectives of victims.9 Victims are
increasingly challenging the field of transitional justice, destabilizing the orthodoxy of
traditional actors and their set ways.10 If victims’ needs have traditionally been subor-
dinated to statebuilding or peacebuilding objectives, transitional justice has progres-
sively moved away from these restrictive considerations.11 In this regard, through the
5 Ibid.
6 Ismael Muvingi, ‘Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies,’ International
Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 181.
7 See for instance: David and Choi Yuk-ping, supra n 3; Jessie Hronesová, ‘Might Makes Right: War
Related Payments in BiH,’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10(3) (2016): 339–360; Daniela Lai,
‘Transitional Justice and Its Discontents: Socioeconomic Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Limits of International Intervention,’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10(3) (2016): 361–381.
The International Center for Transitional Justice has commissioned some excellent empirical work on
transitional justice and generally highlighted the importance of compensation for victims.
8 Jemima Garcı́a-Godos, ‘Victims in Focus,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 10(2) (2016): 350.
9 United Nations, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-recurrence,’ UN Doc. A/74/147, 12 July 2019, para. 6.
10 Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, ‘Introduction: Localizing Transitional Justice,’ in Localizing Transitional
Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence, ed. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf and Pierre Hazan
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 3.
11 Similarly, there is a ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding at the moment, which challenges also the orthodoxy of
peacebuilding practices. See: Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace
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victims turn in transitional justice, the focus on reparations in transitional justice
implies not only doing something against perpetrators (what is usually subsumed
under retributive justice) but also doing something specifically for victims (what is
usually subsumed under restorative justice).12
The second turn, which is arguably more aspirational than actual, it is the socio-
economic turn in transitional justice. Traditionally, transitional justice literature and
practice have more often than not marginalized the socio-economic dimension. In ef-
fect, most of the literature on transitional justice – not unlike the peacebuilding lit-
erature13 – focuses on normative or symbolic aspects while marginalizing material
implications. In the context of transitional justice mechanisms being associated with
higher-than-average increases in inequality,14 some calls have been made in the tran-
sitional justice literature to stop the neglect of economic and social justice issues.15
Despite polls of survivor populations making apparent the reality that socio-
economic concerns take priority over punishment, historical accounting or reconcili-
ation,16 the socio-economic dimension of transitional justice has remained in the
shadow of the political dimension of transitional justice, with an emphasis on civil or
political rights. This situation is increasingly challenged by victims and their repre-
sentatives, pushing for the inclusion of this dimension in transitional justice
mechanisms.
Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace,’ Third World Quarterly 34(5) (2013): 763–783; Nicolas Lemay-
Hébert, ‘The Bifurcation of the Two Worlds: Assessing the Gap Between Internationals and Locals in
State-Building Processes,’ Third World Quarterly 32(10) (2011): 1823–1841.
12 Jemima Garcı́a-Godos and Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Introduction,’ in Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding
on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants, ed. Chandra Lekha Sriram et al. (London: Routledge, 2012),
4–8; Ruth Rubio-Marı́n and Pablo de Greiff, ‘Women and Reparations,’ International Journal of
Transitional Justice 1(3) (2007): 319.
13 For a critique, see: Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Stefanie Kappler, ‘What Attachment to Peace? Exploring
the Normative and Material Dimensions of Local Ownership In Peacebuilding,’ Review of International
Studies 42(5) (2016): 815–914; Catherine Baker and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, ‘Mapping the Nexus of
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,’ in Handbook on Intervention and Statebuilding, ed. Nicolas Lemay-
Hébert (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 184–197.
14 Geoff Dancy and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, ‘Bridge to Human Development or Vehicle of Inequality?
Transitional Justice and Economic Structures,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 9 (2015): 65.
15 Louise Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,’ NYU Journal of Law and Politics
40(1) (2007): 1–28; Christine Chinkin, ‘The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post-
Conflict,’ Paper series for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1 January
2007, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf (accessed 5
August 2021); Frank Haldemann and Rachelle Kouassi, ‘Transitional Justice Without Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights?’ in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues
and Challenges, ed. Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), 498; Zinaida Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice,’
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 266–291; Muvingi, supra n 6; Tafadzwa
Pasipanodya, ‘A Deeper Justice: Economic and Social Justice as Transitional Justice in Nepal,’
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2(3) (2008): 378–397; Evelyne Schmid and Aoife Nolan, ‘Do
No Harm? Exploring the Scope of Economic and Social Rights in Transitional Justice,’ International
Journal of Transitional Justice 8(3) (2014): 363.
16 Padraig McAuliffe, ‘Dividing the Spoils: The Impact of Power Sharing on Possibilities for Socioeconomic
Transformation in Postconflict States,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 11 (2017): 198; Lars
Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,’ Social and Legal
Studies 21(2) (2012): 175.
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In many ways, the two ‘turns’ are closely connected together; victims have forced
their way to the front of the transitional justice scene precisely through the mechan-
ism of material reparations, prompting the field to look beyond traditional justice
and truth-telling debates.17 These two turns – victims-centred and socio-economic –
have certainly been prominent in the specific context of UN peacebuilding, where
there has been an increase of third-party claims, asking for material reparations in the
case of human rights abuses. In the Mothers of Srebrenica case, family members of
individuals who died during the Bosnian War (when the UN was supposed to pro-
tect them in a safe haven) have demanded compensation from the United Nations
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands by alleging that both are responsible for the
failure to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica. The court cases have revolved around
the absolute immunity of the United Nations, which has been upheld by Dutch
courts but is nevertheless increasingly contested (as also made clear in the Haiti chol-
era case), but also the legal responsibility of the Dutch state in protecting individuals.
The Kosovo Lead Poisoning case involves the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian minorities
of Kosovo, forced from their homes in Mitrovica after the Kosovo war. The UN, as
Kosovo’s sovereign at that time, resettled about 600 of them between 1999 and 2013
in camps contaminated from nearby mines included in the Trepca mines complex.
In 2016, in response to a complaint submitted by 138 individuals from these com-
munities, the UN Human Rights Advisory Panel – created by UNMIK to examine
alleged violations of human rights by UNMIK – found that UNMIK had violated
people’s rights to life and health, and recommended that the UN apologize and pay
individual compensation. The UN has however only created a voluntary trust for
community assistance projects, described by the Special Rapporteur on the implica-
tions for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of
hazardous substances and wastes, Baskut Tuncak, as ‘inoperative and fundamentally
flawed (. . .) which will neither provide justice nor the necessary elements of an ef-
fective remedy for the victims.’18 And finally, there is obviously the Haiti cholera case
discussed in this article. These third-party claims do also mirror wider claims for rep-
arations against former colonial powers19 – something that has been discussed more
precisely in the context of Haiti. In this regard, some argue for the expansion of tran-
sitional justice into the realm of redistributive justice, highlighting discrimination and
marginalization at play through unequal access to socio-economic rights.20 Without
entering into the much disputed area of the longstanding economic disparities (or
economic violence) that are present in all societies and how to address these wide-
17 Garcı́a-Godos, supra n 8.
18 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘UN Must Urgently Provide Redress
for Minorities Placed in Toxic Kosovo Camps, Says UN Rights Expert,’ 13 March 2019, https://www.
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24319&LangID=E (accessed 5 August
2021).
19 Luke Moffett, ‘Transitional Justice and Reparations: Remedying the Past?’ in Research Handbook on
Transitional Justice, ed. Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett and Dob Jacobs (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2017), 377–400.
20 Jemima Garcı́a-Godos, ‘Victims’ Rights and Distributive Justice: in Search of Actors,’ Human Rights
Review 14(3) (2013): 241–255; Miller, supra n 15.
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ranging inequalities through transitional justice mechanisms,21 one could practically
circumscribe the socio-economic turn to the reparations debates, in practice focusing
on the nature of the reparation.22 Of course, the two issues are not neatly separated;
neglecting the socio-economic needs of victims will more often than not amount to
increasing long-standing inequalities in societies. However, we posit here that repara-
tions can either be of a material or symbolic nature, and need to be tailored to the
needs expressed by the victim population. Whilst symbolic reparations have trad-
itionally been the focus of transitional justice, the material dimension of reparations
does offer a window into the socio-economic turn as discussed above.
By taking the socio-economic turn in reparations debates seriously, and juxtapos-
ing this on debates between collective and individual reparations, we suggest four
ideal-typical situations, connected with different transitional justice mechanisms.
This is made by connecting two separate dimensions of reparations – the means of
reparations (symbolic or material) and the focus of reparations (individual or collect-
ive), captured in Table 1. A caveat needs to be added at this stage. The situations
described below are ideal-typical situations, both a simplification of a much more
complex reality and the accentuation of one of several aspects of reality following
Weberian sociology.23 We fully acknowledge that material means of reparations can















21 This is an angle developed in Lisa J. Laplante, ‘Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and
Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework,’ International
Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 331–355; Miller, supra n 15; Muvingi, supra n 6; Dustin N. Sharp,
‘Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a Positive-Peace Paradigm for
Transitional Justice,’ Fordham International Law Journal 35(3) (2012): 780–814. We agree with Schmid
and Nolan that economic and social rights violations can be discrete and do not necessarily need to be
treated through a structural lens. Schmid and Nolan, supra n 15 at 372.
22 The focus on historic economic disparities is what makes a number of scholars dubious about the feasibil-
ity of the socio-economic turn in transitional justice. See for instance: Waldorf, supra n 16; Padraig
McAuliffe, ‘The Prospects for Transitional Justice in Catalyzing Socioeconomic Justice in Postconflict
States: A Critical Assessment in Light of Somalia’s Transition,’ Northeast African Studies 14(2) (2014):
77–110.
23 Philipp Lottholz and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Re-reading Weber, Re-conceptualizing Statebuilding: From
Neo-Weberian to Post-Weberian Approaches to State, Legitimacy and State-building,’ Cambridge Review
of International Affairs 29(4) (2016): 1470.
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translate into symbolic forms of reparations for instance, or that symbolic reparations
shape how the material conditions of human existence are rendered intelligible.24
Furthermore, the situations discussed below are not mutually exclusive. One could cer-
tainly imagine an actor involved in a transitional justice process combining many different
means of reparations through different individual policies, with different loci of interven-
tions. However, we would argue that each specific transitional justice process, once the
different policies are aggregated, tends to privilege one of the scenarios over the others.
On the symbolic axis, the first situation (Situation 1 in Table 1) encompasses a focus
on the individual as an actor of choice for symbolic reparations. This might involve apolo-
gies by perpetrators of human rights abuses delivered on a personal basis, annual ceremo-
nies or performances or gestures of recognition and atonement.25 It could include
apologies by perpetrators themselves (private apologies), or public apologies made in a
face-to-face setting or with individualized letters of apology sent to each victim.26 The UN’s
decision to send officials to listen to stories of victims and relatives of victims of cholera in
Haiti, and offer an apology in this setting, can hence be seen to be part of this scenario.
This category can even include hybrid institutions such as gacaca courts in Rwanda, used
to punish perpetrators and reconcile communities through public confessions.27 If one
leaves the punitive element of the gacaca courts aside, which is beyond the analysis of this
article, there is a clear performative emphasis on localized reconciliation in this practice.28
The second situation (Situation 2 in Table 1) involves a focus on symbolic means
of reparations with a public or collective focus. This typically encompasses apologies
made to the community or to the country as a whole, but without a direct and per-
sonal connection in the delivery of the apology, or memorial practices meant to fos-
ter justice and social reconciliation such as commemorative sites, memory museums
or the renaming of public spaces.29 This is the option that tends to be privileged by a
number of important organizations, probably because of the practicality of it. It ena-
bles actors to engage in reconciliation efforts without having to undertake potentially
costly financial reparations to victims (Situation 3 and 4 in Table 1) or to engage in
symbolic reparations in locally relevant ways or through potentially tricky local inter-
actions (Situation 1 in Table 1). If most collective symbolic reparation projects are
accompanied with other forms of reparations, notably material, a few examples can
help to discern the boundaries of such an approach. The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission is generally represented as a template for the symbolic
dimension of reparation. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is also a good
24 Robin Adèle Greeley, Michael R. Orwitz, José Luis Falconi, Ana Marı́a Reyes, Fernando J. Rosenberg and
Lisa J. Laplante, ‘Repairing Symbolic Reparations: Assessing the Effectiveness of Memorialization in the
Inter-American System of Human Rights,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 14(1) (2020): 187;
Lisa Magarrell, ‘Reparations in Theory and Practice,’ International Center for Transitional Justice
Reparative Justice Series (2007), 4.
25 Robin Adèle Greele et al., supra n 24 at 166.
26 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict
States: Reparations Programmes (Geneva: UN, 2008), 23.
27 Joanna Pozen, Richard Neugebauer and Joseph Ntaganira, ‘Assessing the Rwanda Experiment: Popular
Perceptions of Gacaca in Its Final Phase,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 8(1) (2014): 31–52.
28 Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice Without Lawyers
(Cambridge: CUP, 2010).
29 UNOHCHR, supra n 26 at 23.
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example of an organization focusing on collective symbolic reparation,30 with a spe-
cific focus on public apologies or memorial practices. In one specific case, having
judged the Mexican state guilty of violating its international responsibility to safe-
guard the lives and personal integrity of young female victims of femicide in Mexico,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights judged it pertinent for the state to ‘erect
a monument to commemorate the women victims of gender-based violence in
Ciudad Juárez.’31 The monument was not well received by the victims’ families, who
saw it as an effort to divert attention from structural violence in Mexico.32 Other
examples include ex post apologies by UN Secretary-Generals after lengthy inde-
pendent inquiries. For instance, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan apologized
and expressed remorse in 1999 for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the 1995 fall of
Srebrenica, which happened under Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s tenure.33 Another ex-
ample is the issue of reparations to former colonies, which has traditionally been
dealt with through symbolic means of reparations. If this involves in very specific
cases material compensations – such as the recent decision by the Netherlands to
pay reparations to Indonesian victims of colonial atrocities (which would fall under
Scenario 3 in Table 1) – former imperial powers generally favour memorialization or
public apologies whilst shying away from the material side of the argument. The
third situation (Situation 3 in Table 1) includes material means of reparation with a
focus on the individual. This tends to be operationalized through judicial reparations
procedures, operating on a case-by-case basis and usually tailoring the compensation
to the proportion of the harm suffered, or through out-of-court programmes, com-
pensating everyone within the same category violation roughly the same way.34
Taking some policies outside of the wider context of justice and reparations, exam-
ples would include Colombia’s recent promise of US$27.5 billion for victims’ repara-
tions, Poland’s promise of US$125 million for former political prisoners following its
transition to democracy35 or US$224,000 awarded to families of those disappeared
in Argentina.36 Individual material reparations can include payments in cash or provi-
sion of service packages, which may in turn include provisions for education, health
and housing.37
The fourth situation (Situation 4 in Table 1) involves collective material repara-
tions. This traditionally includes collective development projects aimed at mitigating
the effects of the conflict or disaster, or targeting the specific needs of the victim
population. Most postconflict or post-disaster countries are likely to favour future-
oriented collective reparations that will in principle benefit larger social groups than
30 Adèle Greele et al., supra n 24.
31 Adèle Greele et al., supra n 24 at 169.
32 Adèle Greele et al., supra n 24 at 171. If femicide has been a major issue in Mexico (and in many other
countries), it is even more the case with COVID-19 restrictions, which led between 80,000 and 120,000
women to march in Mexico City on 8 March 2020 to demand justice.
33 United Nations, ‘Kofi Annan Emphasizes Commitment to Enabling UN Never Again to Fail in
Protecting Civilian Population from Genocide or Mass Slaughter,’ UN Doc. SG/SM/7263/AFR/196, 16
December 1999.
34 Marı́n and de Greiff, supra n 12 at 321–322.
35 Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra n 14 at 53–54.
36 Moffett, supra n 19.
37 UNOHCHR, supra n 26 at 22.






/ijtj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijtj/ijab020/6354197 by guest on 19 August 2021
spending scarce resources on individual reparations would,38 and as such will argue
that ‘development is reparation.’39 In this context, there is a need to make sure that
this is not in fact a ploy to label existing programmes as ‘reparations’ without actually
engaging with the specific needs and concerns of the victim population.
T H E N E X U S B E T W E E N T R A N S I T I O N A L J U S T I C E A N D
D E V E L O P M E N T : F R O M C O L L E C T I V E T O I N D I V I D U A L F O C U S
Scholars have already questioned the artificial disconnect between transitional justice
and development, and have suggested that both fields share a similar structure of
practice.40 Some see international development as focusing on the collective level
when transitional justice is more focused on the individual level;41 however, we have
suggested a more nuanced perspective in the previous section. To build on the con-
tribution of the matrix above, we argue that recent developments in international de-
velopment literature and practice, especially the increasing focus on cash transfer
programmes, can shed new light on reparation debates, especially in terms of the de-
bate between collective and individual material reparations. The field of development
is increasingly embracing the individual scale of practice, and this has ramifications
for debates on the feasibility and suitability of individual material reparations in tran-
sitional justice.
Actually, over the past 25 years a ‘quiet revolution’ has seen governments in the
developing world invest in increasingly large-scale cash transfer programmes.42
There are over 130 low- and middle-income countries that have at least one non-
contributory unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programme in place, with even
more conditional cash transfer programmes operating in parallel.43 First and fore-
most, while cash transfers are not a panacea for development, they empower individ-
ual recipients as decision-makers, promoting a ‘rights-based approach to
development.’44 Cash transfers are particularly appropriate in situations either where
it is physically difficult to reach the poorest and those in need (such as in the
38 Christopher J. Colvin, ‘Purity and Planning: Shared Logics of Transitional Justice and Development,’
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2018): 418.
39 UNOHCHR, supra n 26 at 26; Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Katharine Orlovsky, ‘A Complementary
Relationship: Reparations and Development,’ Research Brief, International Center for Transitional
Justice, July 2009.
40 Rama Mani, ‘Editorial: Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus Between
Transitional Justice and Development,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 253–265;
Colvin, supra n 38 at 419.
41 Colvin, supra n 38 at 418.
42 UK Department for International Development, Cash Transfers: Literature Review, Policy Division,
April 2011, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cash-transfers-literature-review.pdf
(accessed 5 August 2021).
43 Francesca Bastagli, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Georgina Sturge, ‘Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence
Say? A Rigorous Review of Programme Impact and the Role of Design and Implementation Features,’
London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2016, 13, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/re
source-documents/11316.pdf (accessed 5 August 2021). We will not discuss the specifics about the con-
ditional versus unconditional cash transfer programmes, as this has limited benefits to the current discus-
sion. Rather, we will focus primarily on unconditional cash transfer schemes, as this would be potentially
more suitable for any reparation scheme to the victims of cholera in Haiti.
44 George Ingram and John MacArthur, ‘From One to Many: Cash Transfer Debates in Ending Extreme
Poverty,’ Brookings Institution, 19 December 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-develop
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aftermath of disasters or conflicts) or where the state infrastructure is simply exclud-
ing the poorest from its reach, as is certainly the case in Haiti. Cash transfers are
‘transformative,’ increasing individuals’ sense of self-worth, dignity and assertive-
ness.45 It has also been noted that ‘unconditional cash transfers have significant
impacts on economic outcomes and psychological well-being.’46
Chris Blattman has demonstrated that:
cash grants to the poor are as good as or better than many traditional forms of
aid when it comes to reducing poverty. Study after study has shown that recipi-
ents of cash grants invest the money or spend it on such basic items as food
and better shelter. Poor people don’t always make the best choices with their
money, of course, but fears that they consistently waste it are simply not borne
out in the available data.47
Actually, a systematic review of all the evidence on the effects of cash transfers on
individuals and households over 15 years from 2000 to 2015 (including 201 studies)
reflects ‘how powerful a policy instrument cash transfers can be, and highlights the
range of potential benefits for beneficiaries.’48
Amongst the main worries about cash transfer programmes are that there will be
price effects49 or that conditionality might restrict individual agency.50 There are also
traditional paternalistic arguments at play,51 with some actors doubting that poor
people can make reasonable and well-informed choices. The systematic review of the
cash transfer literature demonstrates that the evidence does not support these con-
cerns and that ‘for studies reporting statistically significant results, the vast majority
are in the direction policy-makers intend to achieve.’52 As previously mentioned,
cash transfer programmes are not necessarily a panacea, but any discussion of their
limitations should happen in conjunction with a discussion of the limitations of ‘trad-
itional’ development project as well.53
ment/2018/12/19/from-one-to-many-cash-transfer-debates-in-ending-extreme-poverty/ (accessed 5
August 2021).
45 Maxine Molyneux, Nicola Jones and Fiona Samuels, ‘Can Cash Transfer Programmes Have
“Transformative” Effects?’ The Journal of Development Studies 52(8) (2016): 1095.
46 Johannes Haushofer and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘The Short-Term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to
the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4) (2016): 1973–
2042.
47 Christopher Blattman and Paul Niehaus, ‘Show Them the Money: Why Giving Cash Helps Alleviate
Poverty,’ Foreign Affairs 93(3) (2014): 117–126.
48 Bastagli et al., supra n 43.
49 Jesse Cunha, Giacomo de Giorgi and Seema Jayachandran, ‘The Price Effects of Cash Versus In-Kind
Transfers,’ Review of Economic Studies 86 (2019): 240–281; Deon Filmer et al., ‘Cash Transfers, Food
Prices, and Nutrition Impacts on Nonbeneficiary Children,’ Policy Research Working Paper 8377, World
Bank, March 2018.
50 Birte Vogel, Kristina Tschunkert and Isabelle Schlapfer, ‘The Social Meaning of Money:
Multidimensional Implications of Humanitarian Cash and Voucher Assistance,’ Disaster (online first)
(2021).
51 Janet Currie and Firouz Gahvari, ‘Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data,’ Journal of
Economic Literature 46(2) (2008): 333–383.
52 Bastagli et al., supra n 43 at 12–13.
53 See the impact of traditional development aid on the labour market in Haiti: Nicolas Lemay-Hébert et al.,
‘The Internal Brain Drain: Foreign Aid, Hiring Practices, and International Migration,’ Disasters 44(4)
(2020): 621–640.
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B A C K G R O U N D : T H E H A I T I C H O L E R A C A S E A N D I T S
R A M I F I C A T I O N S
Before discussing the specific case study of Haiti and the findings of our field research, it
is important to put the Haiti cholera case in context. Between 2004 and 2018, the UN
has fielded a peacekeeping mission in Haiti, the United Nations Stabilization Mission for
Haiti (MINUSTAH),54 and some of those peacekeepers brought cholera with them.55
The UN did not properly screen its peacekeepers for cholera,56 and poor sanitary practi-
ces at the UN base contributed to raw faecal waste carrying cholera flowing directly into
a stream, the Meille River, that runs into a tributary that feeds Haiti’s main river, the
Artibonite. Given that vast numbers of people rely on the Artibonite River for washing,
cooking, cleaning and drinking, cholera quickly spread around many parts of the country.
Over 820,000 people have been infected and 9,792 people have died due to the illness;
however, the real death toll could be three times the official figures because of underre-
porting in the initial outbreak.57 The illness completely upended the life of whole com-
munities: children have lost parents and breadwinners, resulting in severe instability and
lost schooling, and families continue to struggle to pay off debt for medical care and bur-
ial expenses, and such debt has often plunged them deeper into poverty.58 In January
2020, Haiti celebrated one full year of being free of cholera, with no new case reported
since 24 January 2019.59 However, if the illness has been stopped in its tracks, the issue
of reparation to the cholera victims has not progressed, which has led a group of 14 UN
mandate holders to send an allegation letter to the UN Secretary-General and Haitian
government critiquing the ongoing failure to deliver effective remedies for victims of
cholera in Haiti. If the worldwide coronavirus crisis brings relief efforts back to the
54 For more on the history of the peacekeeping mission, see: Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Chapter 61: United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),’ in Oxford Handbook of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 720–730.
55 Whilst there has been a debate regarding the origin of the disease in the early days of the outbreak, ‘scien-
tific evidence now points overwhelmingly to the responsibility of the peacekeeping mission as the source
of the outbreak,’ in the words of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights.
United Nations, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,’ UN Doc. A/
71/367, 26 August 2016.
56 UN protocol requires that troops pass a basic health screening. Symptomatic individuals undergo labora-
tory tests for infectious diseases but individuals who do not exhibit active symptoms are not tested.
However, many of those shedding viable cholera bacteria remain asymptomatic. Furthermore, the South
Asian strain of cholera active in Haiti has been shown to cause a greater number of asymptomatic cases,
to persist longer in the environment and to exist in higher concentrations in faeces. Paul Farmer, Haiti
After the Earthquake (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 195.
57 Rick Gladstone, ‘Cholera Deaths in Haiti Could Far Exceed Official Count,’ The New York Times, 18
March 2016.
58 International Human Rights Clinic of the Harvard Law School, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, ‘Violations of the Right to Effective Remedy: The UN’s
Responsibility for Cholera in Haiti,’ Joint Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of
Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, 2, http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-con
tent/uploads/2020/02/HLS-IHRC-IJDH-BAI-Submission-to-Special-Procedures_Cholera.pdf (accessed
5 August 2021).
59 Pan American Health Organization and World Health Organization, ‘Haiti Reaches One-Year Free of
Cholera,’ 23 January 2020, https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=15684:haiti-reaches-one-year-free-of-cholera&Itemid=1926&lang=en (accessed 5 August 2021).
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forefront of the international community efforts in Haiti, ‘this new threat cannot mask
past failures and ongoing violations’ in the words of the UN mandate holders.60
At first, the UN relied on its absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of na-
tional courts to avoid accountability for introducing cholera into Haiti. The UN
also failed to set up alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Haiti, leaving
victims without any possible avenue to voice their complaints.61 This policy has
been dubbed ‘morally unconscionable, legally indefensible, and politically self-
defeating’ by a UN Special Rapporteur.62 Furthermore, recent scholarship has
contested the reliance on absolute immunity by organizations such as the UN,63
and practitioners on the ground, representing 5,000 victims of cholera, have chal-
lenged that immunity through the New York District Court. If the legal challenge
by the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and the Institute for Justice and
Democracy in Haiti did not result in an effective re-assessment of the UN’s abso-
lute immunity, it certainly contributed to adding considerable pressure on the or-
ganization to modify its stance on the issue.64
On 1 December 2016, in a dramatic turn of events, the UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon finally apologized for the cholera epidemic in Haiti – in English,
French and Haitian Creole. If the apology fell short of recognizing the UN’s
responsibility for the actual outbreak, emphasizing rather a ‘moral responsibility
to act’ and a ‘collective responsibility to deliver,’ it actually led to a ‘New
Approach’ by the UN, including a US$400 million plan as a ‘concrete and sincere
expression of the Organization’s regret.’65 The UN’s launch of the New
60 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), supra n 4.
61 UN General Assembly Resolution 22(1), Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
UN Doc. A/RES/22(1) (13 Feb. 1946), s. 29. For a treatment of this issue, see: Rosa Freedman, ‘UN
Immunity or Impunity? A Human Rights Based Challenge,’ European Journal of International Law 25(1)
(2014): 239–254.
62 United Nations, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,’ UN Doc. A/
71/367, 26 August 2016.
63 See for instance: Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Immunities of the United Nations and Human Rights,’ in Cambridge Handbook on Immunities and
International Law, ed. Tom Ruys, Nicolas Angelet and Luca Ferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2019), 579–594; Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Towards an Alternative
Interpretations of UN Immunity: A Human Rights-Based Approach to the Haiti Cholera Case,’ Questions
of International Law 8(19) (2015): 5–18; Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘“Jistis ak repar-
asyon pou tout viktim kolera MINUSTAH”: The United Nations and the Right to Health in Haiti,’
Leiden Journal of International Law 28(3) (2015): 507–527; Rosa Freedman, Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and
Siobhan Wills, The Law and Practice of International Peacekeeping: Foregrounding Human Rights
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
64 The added pressure came from a wide array of sources, including excellent reporting on the issue by jour-
nalists, a high-profile report by the UN Special Rapporteur Philipp Alston, noting that ‘the UN opted to
abdicate its responsibility’ and blaming the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) for coming up with a ‘pa-
tently artificial and wholly unfounded legal pretence for insisting that the Organization must not take
legal responsibility for what it has done,’ as well as a diplomatic initiative by University of Birmingham
scholars to raise the profile of the cholera issue in the UN Security Council debates. See: United Nations,
supra n 61; Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘The Security Council in Practice: Haiti, Cholera,
and the Elected Members of the United Nations Security Council,’ Leiden Journal of International Law
33(1) (2020): 157–176.
65 United Nations General Assembly, ‘A New Approach to Cholera in Haiti: Report by the Secretary-
General,’ UN Doc A/71/620, 25 November 2016.
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Approach presented a critical opportunity to repair victims’ injuries and restore
trust in the UN.66 In the words of the Secretary-General, it became ‘an important
test’ of the UN’s commitment to its own principles.67 The plan has two tracks:
the first track focuses on intensified efforts to prevent and eradicate cholera, and
the second track promises to deliver ‘a package of material assistance and support
to those Haitians most directly affected by cholera’ to be developed in a victim-
centred manner, including through consultations with victims. The plan is woe-
fully underfunded – only 4 percent of the amount promised has been raised so
far – with the UN opting to rely solely on charitable donations to fund the
efforts.68 The result is that more than 10 years after the initial cholera outbreak,
and four years after the UN Secretary-General’s apology, victims are still waiting
for justice and for concrete reparations.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) has been tasked with undertaking con-
sultations with victims, owing to their expertise on community-based approaches.
However, there is a fear that consultations might raise expectations, especially in terms of
individual reparations which are deemed difficult to achieve.69 There is also a recognition
that projects undertaken under Tracks 1 and 2 may well be the same projects, the differ-
ence being that Track 2 has a ‘symbolic aspect.’70 The objective of this article is to con-
tribute to this discussion by highlighting the preferences of the victims with regard to the
means of reparations (symbolic or material) and the focus of the reparations (individual
or collective).
D A T A A N D M E T H O D S
This article is based on participatory action research (PAR) conducted by the authors in
cholera-affected communities in Haiti.71 We followed a team of local lawyers from the
Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) in March 2017 who were meeting local support
groups for cholera victims and discussing possible compensation avenues with these
communities. Our research team is composed of ourselves, a group of BAI’s lawyers and
one international lawyer from BAI’s sister organization, the Institute for Justice and
Democracy in Haiti (IJDH). The data was gathered between 14 and 16 March 2017 in
rural localities around Mirebalais in the Artibonite region, where cholera first broke out
and where some of the most affected communities are located. We made three separate
trips to the Mirebalais region: one to La Chapelle (Lachapèl), one to Saut-D’Eau (or
66 IHRC, BAI and IJDH, supra n 57.
67 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General’s Remarks to the General Assembly on a New
Approach to Address Cholera in Haiti,’ 1 December 2016, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/state
ment/2016-12-01/secretary-generals-remarks-general-assembly-new-approach-address (accessed 5
August 2021).
68 See the constantly updated figures on: http://www.time2deliver.org/ (accessed 5 August 2021).
69 Interview with Nadine Therer, Deputy Country Director (Haiti), UNDP, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 13 March
2017.
70 Ibid.
71 The research project has received ethical approval from the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical
Review Committee, University of Birmingham, in February 2017 (ERN_17-0206), where the lead author
of this piece was based at the time of the research.
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Sodo) and one to Boucan-Carré (Boukan Karé). Different neighbouring communities
were represented in each of these meetings.72 The sessions took place in communal
buildings such as a church or school, and all victims and their families were invited to at-
tend. Each session began with a video screening of Ban Ki-Moon’s apology to the chol-
era victims. It was the first time that most victims had seen the video or had heard the
words spoken by the former UN Secretary-General. After receiving an explanation of the
meaning of this apology from the Haitian lawyers, the victims were told that the most
important and meaningful part of the apology was when Ban Ki-Moon acknowledged
that ‘apologies do not cure diseases,’ which was a way to introduce the reparation issue
by the Haitian lawyers. Large and small group discussions focused on what the different
communities want from the UN. Individuals explained why they wanted to be consulted,
and the types of remedies they are seeking from the United Nations. As researchers, we
listened and followed discussions regarding the establishment of these groups of victims,
without intervening in the process. We opted to hold one focus group at the end of each
day, to discuss the issues related to reparations without interfering too much with the
work of the lawyers we were following. The focus groups were conducted in Creole (un-
less specific participants wanted to express opinions in French) and were translated into
French or English by the lawyer from IJDH accompanying us on this trip. Focus groups
were comprised of between two and five people, selected from individuals who expressed
an interest in discussing these issues with us. We have also met separately with commu-
nity representatives from the different localities.
A further note on the methodological approach buttressing this piece.
Traditionally, participatory action research is understood as a methodological
resource:
through which ‘outsiders’ accompany ‘insiders’ in processes designed to en-
hance critical awareness and leadership capacities through shared collabora-
tions and to initiate collective actions aimed at improving conditions in co-
researchers’ lives in order to bring about a more just and equitable society.73
If PAR has been used to look at the participative side of reconciliation processes,
looking at how researchers can contribute to designing with local people the tools
and approaches of reconciliation,74 in our specific case the emphasis was more on
the activist side of the research, what some would simply call action research,75 or
72 For Lachapelle: Lépinard; Mathurin; La Croix; Joly; Ciprit; Ravine Canot; Haute au vent. For Saut-
D’Eau: Carrefour Saut-D’Eau; Dubuisson; Lamarre; Filate; Gilo. For Boucan-Carré: Daman; Terre
Blanche; Bois Cochon; Chapeauto; Cite Lila; Peligne.
73 Alison Crosby and M. Brinton Lykes, ‘Mayan Women Survivors Speak: The Gendered Relations of
Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala,’ Internaitonal Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011): 459.
74 Angela Santamarı́a Dunen Muelas, Paula Caceres, Wendi Kuetguaje andJulian Villegas, ‘Decolonial
Sketches and Intercultural Approaches to Truth: Corporeal Experiences and Testimonies of Indigenous
Women in Colombia,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 14(1) (2020): 56–79; Virginie Ladisch
and Christalla Yakinthou, ‘Cultivated Collaboration in Transitional Justice Practice and Research:
Reflections on Tunisia’s Voices of Memory Project,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 14(1)
(2020): 80–101.
75 In a seminal article on the subject, John Bennett for instance separates applied from action anthropology
on the basis of the nature of the relationship of the researcher with the organization under study. If the
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‘passionate scholarship.’76 Local actors did not need us to initiate a collective action,
and we would certainly not claim that we enhanced local capacities through our
interactions. Furthermore, we would not claim a shepherding role in the practices
analysed in this article, taking local actors by the hand so to speak. The impetus of
this project came from a mutual understanding that granting us access to their prac-
tice in local communities would increase the legitimacy of the data-gathering process
and multiply the possibilities for the voice of the cholera victims to be heard. As
such, all research actors involved – both international and local – shared a commit-
ment to a victim-centred process of reparation, meant to bring to the forefront the
voice of the cholera victims in Haiti. Finally, this research project was also built on
the previous interactions and knowledge of the parties involved and on more than a
decade of involvement in Haiti, and was specifically understood as a follow-up to
previous collaborative initiatives between the authors and BAI/IJDH.77
R E P A R A T I O N S : W H A T D O T H E H A I T I A N S W A N T ?
The Benefit of Consultations
Beyond their contribution as symbolic reparations, consultations can also be import-
ant for recognizing the importance of the preference expressed by the victim popula-
tion. Most participants in the focus groups were absolutely adamant about the
importance of the consultations with the United Nations and about the fact that vic-
tims should be at the centre of the reparation process. As the community representa-
tive from Saut-D’Eau mentioned:
it is important that they hear about our suffering. When cholera broke out peo-
ple would die on the roads, people were dying on the way to hospital. We
didn’t have money for burials. Neighbours would chip in for funeral costs. We
are left with the bill. We need to be paid back for that. What we want is a dia-
logue to get everyone reparations. They should come to talk to us even if they
cannot give us everything we ask for. We will listen, we will respond, we will
have proposals for them. They should talk to us and not to the state.
A distrust of the state – a theme that has a long tradition in Haiti78 – was held by
most participants, who feared that state officials would not represent the interests of
the victims if they were tasked to represent them. According to a participant in the
focus group of Lachapelle:
researcher is employed by the organization, it is ‘applied research,’ if the relationship is on a ‘voluntaristic’
basis then it is ‘action research.’ John W. Bennett, ‘Applied and Action Anthropology: Ideological and
Conceptual Aspects,’ Current Anthropology 36 (1996): S23–S53.
76 M. Brinton Lykes, ‘Dialogue with Guatemalan Indian Women: Critical Perspectives on Constructing
Collaborative Research,’ in Representations: Social Constructions of Gender, ed. R. Unger (Amityville:
Baywood, 1989), 167–185.
77 Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, supra n 63.
78 See: Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Resistance in the Time of Cholera: The Limits of Stabilization Through
Securitization in Haiti,’ International Peacekeeping 21(2) (2014): 198–213; Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Living in
the Yellow Zone: The Political Geography of Intervention in Haiti,’ Political Geography 67 (2018): 88–99.
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we know whenever they [state officials] are involved in making decisions they
don’t come to us and ask, they just do what is good for them. They are always
looking after themselves; and the people who are victims will not get anything.
For a participant in the focus group in Saut-D’Eau, the message was quite clear:
don’t consult with the state. The state only wants to enrich itself. The state
takes things for itself. We would prefer to be in direct conversation with the
UN and not for them to go to the state.
Finally, according to a participant in our focus group in Boucan-Carré:
the state abuses our rights – the UN shouldn’t go to the state. The state will
give false information. They need to have a sense of the real situation down
here, to really understand the victims’ point of view. They are too many corri-
dors with the state. The truth will get lost.
This is a poetic way to raise the issue of (mis)representation of the population
and victims by the state elite, but it also highlights the issues that participants deem
crucial – the need for them to be heard directly and the need for the United Nations
to really understand the local priorities. According to the same participant:
it is important to consult with us. We are the victims. We want to tell our pri-
orities. Maybe we can go further together. In any case they can come and hear
from us and use it as the basis for their analysis. Consulting local victims’
groups will enable the UN to have a better sense of priorities.
The Issues with Collective Material Reparations
When asked what type of reparations – collective or individual – the different victim
groups would privilege, every single one of them mentioned individual material rep-
arations, and two groups out of 18 wanted individual and collective material repara-
tions at the same time. Not a single group mentioned a preference for collective
material reparations over individual reparations. The main reason is rooted in the ex-
perience that most Haitians living in the countryside have had with the state and
with international aid. Haitian history is marked by constant social struggles between
the political and economic elite and the moun andeyo (or outsiders), those who are
not considered part of the nation and are excluded from its benefits and recogni-
tion.79 As such, expecting mainly self-subsistence farmers, living in the countryside,
to trust the state or the ‘international community’ to deliver on promises (in this
case, community projects) is simply too much to ask for many. As one individual
representing the Ravine Canot locality (in Lachapelle) indicated, ‘it is the role of the
state to provide hospitals. Reparations shouldn’t take away the responsibility of the
state.’ Another individual, representing this time Maturin (in Lachapelle) said: ‘they
79 Gérard Barthélémy, L’Univers Rural Haı̈tien: Le Pays en Dehors (Port-au-Prince: Henri Deschamps, 1989).






/ijtj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijtj/ijab020/6354197 by guest on 19 August 2021
will probably have died before enjoying any benefits from the collective reparations
programs.’ Some also pointed out that this will not help to lift people out of poverty.
This led an individual we met in Saut-D’Eau to ask us a simple question: ‘why should
the state be given the money when they will keep it for themselves and we who suf-
fered will never see any benefit from it?’
The collective projects are also unlikely to reach the remote communities and to
help the most destitute. Collective projects such as health clinics or schools will cre-
ate jobs, but probably jobs needing specific training:
if the UN gives other forms of [collective] help it will help people who have a
little bit of education. It will not help those who need to get back onto their
feet.
For another participant, ‘for people in far-away rural zones, they will not have ac-
cess to services or to projects if collective ones are provided.’ For a participant in the
Boucan-Carré focus group:
community projects would be good but we need to think about the structure
of how they will come. We need to think about the country we are in. Those
who are connected will benefit but the little farmers most affected by cholera
will not benefit from collective projects.
Finally, participants also pointed out that the collective projects being discussed
fall within the remit of the Haitian state, and the international community should
not stand in for the state. For a participant in the Saut-D’Eau focus group:
yes, health centres are good, food is good, all these things are good. But the
state has the obligation to give us these things. We lost our wives, our children,
and now the state wants to let them [the UN] give us things the state has obli-
gations to give us. The state will keep the money but it is us who suffered and
should have the money.
For the same participant, who was in favour of both collective and individual
reparations:
In general, collective projects are good. For example, in a very rural zone where
people had to go on a goat to find a car to get to hospital, a health centre
would benefit them greatly especially if another sickness comes. Community
projects are good. They are the state’s responsibility but in Haiti the state
doesn’t do it, so if the UN has money for building health centres then they
should do it. But that does not mean we should not get individual payments.
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The Benefits of Individual Material Reparations
For many participants, it all comes down to individual situations, with specific fami-
lies being more impacted than others and needing financial support as soon as pos-
sible. For a specific individual representing the Daman community (Boucan-Carré):
‘we did not suffer collectively. Each person suffered individually. We were personally
sick in our own bodies.’ From the participants’ perspective, the main benefit of indi-
vidual reparations is that they are tailored to local needs, respecting local agency in
choosing the best way to deal with the loss of income incurred by the illness. As the
representative from Terre Blanche (Boucan-Carré) mentioned, ‘we want individual
remedies. We want the money to come into our own hands so that if we get sick
again we can look after ourselves.’ For another participant, this time from Bois
Cochon (Boucan-Carré), ‘we just want to be put back on the path, to be given back
the money we spent with our fingers.’ The personal situation can also differ. For the
representative from Haute-au-Vent (Lachapelle): ‘I just want to buy back my land so
that I can have enough money to pay for my children to go to school.’ For the repre-
sentative from Lacroix (Lachapelle):
when we were sick we were the ones who had to spend money. We had to sell
livestock to go far away to hospital in Mirebalais. To get there we needed a
car, and we don’t have cars so we had to pay for that and to pay for medicine.
For the representative from Maturin (Lachapelle), individual reparation can lead
to economic growth: ‘assistance to do commercial activity would help them [people
who lost family members] to recover.’ Individual reparations can also help reach chil-
dren. For the representative of Haute-au-vent (Lachapelle):
the people who especially need compensation are children who have lost their
mothers and can’t go to school or to university. Many children lost family
members and the UN should give them assistance to spend on activities or a
garden or school or things to make their lives better.
Despite the overwhelming preference for individual reparations expressed by vic-
tims, the UN has made a unilateral decision to foreclose compensation in favour of
community projects. It has established platforms to ‘support the project in the com-
munities, serving as an interface between the project itself and the targeted areas’80
in the Cap-Haı̈tien area. Hence, the only material assistance offered by the UN to
date is 20 projects in four communes around Cap-Haı̈tien, and five US$150,000 in-
frastructure projects around Mirebalais.81 As previously mentioned, the UN Special
Rapporteurs pointed out that:
80 UNDP, ‘UN Haiti Cholera Response MPTF Project Quarterly Progress Report Period (Quarter-Year):
4th Q2019 as of 31 December 2019,’ http://mdtf.undp.org/document/download/23711 (accessed 5
August 2021).
81 IHRC, BAI and IJDH, supra n 57.






/ijtj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijtj/ijab020/6354197 by guest on 19 August 2021
some victims prefer monetary payments, an option that was once on the table,
but the UN has foreclosed that possibility seemingly without carrying out con-
sultations or producing a detailed feasibility assessment.
However, ‘compensation is ordinarily a central component of the right to an ef-
fective remedy, and development projects are simply not a replacement for repara-
tions.’82 When we interviewed MINUSTAH staff in 2017, we could sense that there
was a lot of anxiety over opening up the option of compensation to victims, with res-
ervations about the logistics, the potentially spiralling cost of such a programme, as
well as the actual efficiency of compensation in achieving development objectives on
the ground.
C O N C L U S I O N
The victims turn and the socio-economic turn in transitional justice highlight new
reparation dimensions and possibilities, especially when this literature is connected
with the wider international development literature. Through the focus of repara-
tions (individual or collective) and the means of reparations (material or symbolic),
this article shows the different possibilities for actors promoting and advocating for
reparations. In the specific case study of Haiti, it appears clear that individual material
reparations are privileged by the victim population. The New UN Plan for Haiti
includes both a commitment to consult with victims and a preference for collective
reparations, even if in principle all options are open. In the fieldwork conducted for
this article, the victims clearly expressed the willingness to meet with and talk to UN
officials, but also expressed a strong preference for individual material reparations.
For many individuals, collective projects are not always followed through (by inter-
national NGOs or by the government), and these projects also tend to favour those
who are already in a position to benefit from them, including through the staffing of
the projects once completed. Hence, the perception is that the projects will exclude
those who are not in a position to benefit from them, including the most vulnerable
segment of the population and those living in the countryside. Finally, collective
projects do not target specifically those who have been affected by the illness, and
who are currently struggling to make ends meet. Individual material reparations, in
contrast, enable targeting of specific individuals and families who have suffered and
continue to suffer emotionally and economically from the consequences of the
illness.
Most of the participants also emphasized the need to move quickly, a call which
does not seem to be heeded by the UN and other international donors so far. Calls
for urgent action seem to have fallen on deaf ears, as more than five years have
passed since Ban Ki-Moon’s apology and only meagre resources have been mobilized
to help the victims.
The objective of this article is not to enter into the practicalities of individual ma-
terial reparations in the specific context of Haiti. There is a wide literature on how to
operationalize reparations. However, when trying to make sense of the UN discrep-
ancy between words and actions, one has to take into consideration the fact that a
82 OHCHR, supra n 4.






/ijtj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijtj/ijab020/6354197 by guest on 19 August 2021
Haitian life seems to be worth less than a life in most Western countries. If a previ-
ous report by Alston helped push the UN and its Secretary-General at the time to
change its stance on the issue, we hope the recent letter by the 14 UN mandate hold-
ers might also push the UN to do what is right for the Haitian victims. We also hope
that the present article will contribute to the conversation by highlighting the voice
of Haitians in the debate around reparations.
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